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Purpose: This paper analyses the foundations of  trust in a context of  bounded rationality to reach the
conclusion that non-calculative trust is meaningful essentially because of  bounded rationality,  specifying
what aspects of  bounded rationality are relevant for this to happen.
Design/methodology: Building on previous theoretical work we conceptually develop the reasoning
involved to arrive deductively that bounded rationality provides a rationale for the concept of  trust that
goes beyond a calculative notion. 
Findings: We show that there are four reasons for trust to exist and that people assess probabilities to
each in order to determine whether to trust a recipient, depending on each of  the four. We also add to
previous  work  and  show  how  bounded  rationality  provides  additional  arguments  to  show  how
competence, value systems and unselfishness are necessary to underpin trust.  We provide additional
foundations to their three factors, focused on bounded rationality. We add the development of  virtue as
a crucial fourth aspect, which supports the argument that trust can be reinforced between people and
developed through time.
Originality/value: The concept of  trust has been analyzed empirically, but it lacks some theoretical
foundations  to  show  under  which  assumptions  trust  is  a  requirement  that  goes  beyond  mere
calculations, and can be developed or not through time. We also introduce how the concept of  virtue
has a major role in trust development.
Keywords: Trust, Bounded rationality, Virtues development, Ethics
Jel Codes: A13, D03, D21, L22, M14, M21
To cite this article: 
Cugueró-Escofet, N., & Rosanas, J.M. (2019). Trust under bounded rationality: Competence, value systems, 
unselfishness and the development of  virtue. Intangible Capital, 15(1), 1-21. https://doi.org/10.3926/ic.1407
-1-
Intangible Capital – https://doi.org/10.3926/ic.1407
1. Introduction
Trust has become a major topic in management. The special issues that major journals have devoted to the
subject, like the 2003 special issue of  Organizational Science, and the two special issues of  the Academy of
Management Review, in 1998 and in 2009, are signs of  this importance. In Organizational Science, McEvily,
Perrone and Zaheer considered that “although research on trust  in an organizational  context  has  advanced
considerably in recent years, the literature has yet to produce a set of  generalizable propositions that inform our
understanding of  the organization and coordination of  work” (McEvily,  Perrone & Zaheer, 2003, pp. 1).  It
seems reasonable to state that the field of  trust in personal relations and organizations is wide and some central
questions remain unexplored. This paper is intended to answer an important question that recent research in the
field has considered to be basic: “Why do people trust each other?” (Dietz, 2011). 
Different approaches have been used to attempt to find an answer to this question. This paper focuses on the
“rational” approach, with the intention of  showing that bounded rationality is necessary for the word “trust” to
be meaningful; and that the reasons for the existence of  trust arise from specific bounded rationality aspects.
James (2002) showed what he called “the trust paradox”, by which if  rewards are changed so that both players
have an incentive to take the action which is Pareto-optimal, the need for trust disappears. Rosanas (2016) went
one step further to show that unbounded rationality  necessarily leads to a calculative notion of  trust, i.e., that if
human beings were unboundedly rational, then Williamson (1993) would be right in that trust would simply be
another name for risk. What we add here to his approach is the analysis of  the aspects of  bounded rationality
that are at the origin of  a meaningful concept of  trust.
We  think  that  revisiting  trust  and  examining  the  assumptions  that  make  the  concept  necessary  will  reveal
fundamental differences between trust and risk. People trusting other people obviously face some risk, because
this trust can be either honored or betrayed; and, as we have mentioned, trust has even been identified with risk
(Williamson, 1993). However, risk and trust differ, and we are going to show that trust becomes important only
if  it can be distinguished from other concepts with which it shares some commonalities, risk being the main one.
Our endeavor here is twofold. First, we are going to examine trust compared to risk and second, we are going to
show the assumptions that make the existence of  trust possible. We think that this is relevant and useful as a
starting point because the assumptions on which trust is based, and its distinction from risk, have not been
examined following a rigorous theoretical analysis. We think our analysis is helpful because it allows to study the
rational foundation of  trust and, thus, it is an alternative way to the current empirical research and theoretical
models that many researchers have started, which has already led to a better understanding of  trust creation and
reparation processes, and of  their outcomes and effects (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Ferrin & Dirks, 2003; McEvily et
al., 2003; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009; Williams, 2007). 
There is an additional reason why we think that this is an appropriate time to pinpoint the assumptions on which
trust is based, as they are related to bounded rationality. Today, more than ever before, in the context of  a crisis
of  values that has been at the root of  many recent scandals, trust is potentially more useful than ever as the
possible glue that might hold organizations together and increase the probability of  improving the rectitude of
current managerial practices (Hosmer, 1995). In general, definitions must have an intention of  integration and, as
such, the basic assumptions on which they are based must be explicitly included in those definitions. Hosmer
does this by defining trust as the “expectation by one person, group or other firm of  ethically justifiable behavior
– that is, morally correct decisions and actions based upon ethical principles of  analysis – on the part of  the
other person,  group, or  firm in a joint endeavor or economic exchange” (Hosmer,  1995,  pp.  399). Hosmer
considers trust at all possible levels of  analysis, but here we are going to concentrate our rational foundations at
the individual level of  analysis, namely, trust between two people.
Furthermore,  trust  can promote the reinforcement of  moral  virtues and,  thus,  increase the probability  that
companies  may  enter  into  a  process  of  inter-  and  intra-organizational  trust  building.  Dietz  argues  that
institutionally  based trust  is  not  possible  alone;  trust  sources  can come from institutional  and interactional
sources, meaning that now, more than ever before, “cultures depend on a more values-based leadership where
people don’t need to look at the rule book, where they know intuitively what the right thing to do is” (Dietz,
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2011, pp. 218). This is crucial to the development of  virtues: the required self-control and self-empowerment
that creates trustworthiness increases as a result of  a greater commitment to virtues and to the personal integrity
of  leaders. Cultural differences cause people to view trust differently. Different corporate cultures, depending on
the industry of  operations,  also reveal  different approaches to trust  (Ferrin  & Gillespie,  2010).  This makes
reaching an agreement on trust an aspect that organizations need to support. It also seems to be a transversal
characteristic,  even  if  trust  formation  can  be  reached  through  singularities  that  are  dependent  on  cultural
differences.
Some of  the analyses  of  trust  are  based on the  assumption that  trust  is  rationally  based and instrumental
(Kramer & Tyler, 1996, pp. 10); but this instrumental view of  trust is not enough to explain its presence in
people relationships . In fact, and again according to Kramer and Tyler, “trust is important only when people
have social relationships” (Kramer & Tyler, 1996, pp. 10). Besides, as we will see, people often adopt some type
of  rule-based decision-making, based on their own identities as individuals (March, 1987) and their identification
with  a  group,  possibly  to  protect  existing  social  values  and  relationships,  even  in  purely  economic  terms
(Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986). 
As we mentioned, our starting point is the Rosanas (2016) result that unbounded rationality and a concept of
trust  that  goes  beyond  risk  are  incompatible,  i.e.  that  given  unbounded  rationality,  trust  is  reduced  to  a
mechanical form of  calculation. In this paper, we intend to contribute to an integration of  different concepts of
trust and we do so formally developing sufficient conditions for trust to exist. We thus attempt to establish the
decision-theoretical bases on which trust can be founded, showing that ill-known payoffs and preferences first,
and values and value systems next, are essential for a concept of  trust that goes beyond risk.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly review the definitions of  trust that can be found in the
literature. Second, we investigate those situations in which trust between people seems to be a variable worth
considering, showing that the analysis of  bounded rationality provides a reason for a concept of  trust that goes
beyond  the  calculative  notion  discussed  before.  And  we  finish  by  arguing  how  value  systems  provide  an
underpinning for trust based on integrity, while having unselfish values provides an underpinning for trust based
on those values and time-consistent preferences provide an underpinning for trust based on character or virtue.
Finally, we relate the instrumental-rational approach to trust to the social and cultural approaches. 
2. Defining trust and identifying the problem
The concept  of  trust  has  been considered “elusive”  (Arrow,  1974;  Gambetta,  1988;  Williamson,  1993);  so,
finding a proper definition of  trust is not an easy task (Gambetta, 1988; Williamson, 1993). It was originally
defined as simply telling the truth or keeping one’s promises (Dasgupta, 1988). Williamson considers that trust is
just another word for risk taking and that, therefore, all trust is merely calculative (Williamson, 1993). He thus
attaches no special importance to the concept, although later on in the same paper he accepts that there are
other forms of  trust (what he calls hyphenated trust and nearly non-calculative trust) that go beyond the mere
calculative notion. On the other hand, trust has been investigated by behavioral researchers who have considered
it to be linked to openness between two people and the extent to which one person can predict the behavior of
others, especially with respect to what is normally expected of  a person acting in good faith (Gabarro, 1978, pp.
294).
There is one definition that seems very useful for the purpose of  the present paper: the one provided by Zand
(1972). He defines trust as “actions that (a) increase one’s vulnerability, (b) to another whose behavior is not
under  one’s  control,  (c)  in  a  situation  in  which the  penalty  (disutility)  one suffers  if  the  other  abuses  that
vulnerability is greater than the benefit (utility) one gains if  the other does not abuse this vulnerability” (Zand,
1972, pp. 230). Thus, the decision whether to trust comes first (when the trustor evaluates the trustworthiness of
the trustee),  and the decision whether or not to honor that trust comes afterwards. The essence of  Zand’s
definition has been adopted by many authors, except perhaps for point (c),  which has not been considered
crucial  to  many aspects  of  the  analysis.  As  we will  see,  Kreps  (1990)  adopted a  similar  concept  when he
formalized the analysis of  trust as a “one-sided version of  the prisoner’s dilemma game” (Kreps, 1990, pp. 101). 
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Dietz believes “this basic sequence to be a universal dynamic, common to all trust encounters. (…) There is
always an assessment (however thorough) of  the other party’s trustworthiness which informs a preparedness to
be vulnerable that, in genuine acts of  trust, leads to a risk-taking act” (Dietz, 2011, pp. 215). Some aspects may
change, in contrast, in how the process is contextually configured. This mainly depends on how the evaluation of
trustworthiness takes place and which variables are concluded to be more or less important in each part of  the
process. In general, trust has been considered a consequence of  trustworthiness, i.e., mainly a perception of  trust
placed on a person who is evaluated as to whether he/she deserves to be trusted or not. 
In general, most researchers recognize that the literature on trust relies heavily on the fact of  being vulnerable or
assuming some risk associated with the actions others take (Korczynski, 2000), and it seems that there is no
doubt cast on the fact that trust is a risk-taking activity (Dietz, 2011). Korczynski stresses the point that the
literature considers that there are multiple types of  trust – such as rational calculative trust, or altruistic or blind
trust  – and that there is a distinction to be made between personal  trust  and trust  in abstract systems and
institutions (Korczynski, 2000, pp. 3). Recently, as we mentioned before, researchers like Dietz have considered
that it is not the case that many types of  trust exist. They have claimed that there is a universal trust experience
or process, and what differs is how each stage of  this universal trust sequence happens (i.e. considering different
cultural  or  personal  characteristics,  among many  others).  The  differences  in  how this  process  performs  is
apparent in different evaluations of  trustworthiness, cognitions and actions of  trust,  and will  thus originate
different effects coming from a trust experience (Dietz, 2011).
Rousseau et al. in an article reviewing trust, have considered how researchers agree or disagree with the meaning
of  trust. (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998). They consider that the specific conditions for trust to exist
are  two:  1)  the  existence  of  risk  and  2)  interdependence,  which  leads  to  a  definition  of  trust  being  “the
willingness to be vulnerable in conditions of  risk and interdependence” (Rousseau et al., 1998, pp. 395). And
they continue by stating that “trust is not a behavior (e.g. cooperation) or a choice (e.g. taking a risk), but an
underlying psychological condition that can cause or result from such actions” (Rousseau et al., 1998, pp. 395).
Our  focus  is  to  discuss  this  in  terms of  rational  foundations  for  trust,  so  discussing  when trust  becomes
necessary  or  not.  Even  in  a  situation  of  risk  and  interdependence  trust  may  not  be  necessary  if  mere
calculativeness  is  enough  (Rosanas,  2016).  We  discuss  here  that  there  is  a  third  aspect  joining  risk  and
interdependence:  bounded rationality,  whose different  aspects are going to discuss  here  to complement  the
previous two foundations of  trust.
2.1. Formal modeling of  trust
Kreps (1990) provided what might be the best formalization of  the trust process in the form of  a game. He
based his formulation on the following points. First, the situation involves two people: the trustor (labeled A),
and the trustee (labeled B). There is a sequential decision-making process, where A first makes an evaluation
about B’s trustworthiness; after that, A may be willing to trust B. If  A makes the decision to trust B, then B can
make the decision whether to honor that trust or betray A. The payoffs to both A and B will be determined by
this decision. Of  course, if  A does not trust B, B can do nothing (see Figure 1).
“Vulnerability” in the Kreps model, means that if  B betrays A, A’s payoff  is negative, i.e., A is worse off  after the
interaction  than  he/she  was  before.  In  contrast,  if  B  honors  A’s  trust,  then  A’s  payoff  is  positive.  As  we
mentioned before, it is important that the payoffs to B are such that they are positive under both situations (B
betrays and B honors), but are higher if  B betrays. Otherwise, the only problem would be one of  professional
competence, with no possible conflict between the two agents. In that case, there would be no need for personal
trust.
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Figure 1. A quantitative representation of  the trust problem
2.2.Trust and trustworthiness
The most widely used definition of  trustworthiness is the one that was established in an integrative paper by
Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995). They consider that people mainly evaluate three aspects of  the trustee in
order  to  assess  his  or  her  trustworthiness:  ability,  benevolence  and  integrity.  They  consider  the  trustor’s
willingness to enter into a risk-taking activity to be a central aspect, as trust entails the “willingness of  a party to
be vulnerable to the actions of  another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular
action important to the trustor, irrespective of  the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al.,
1995, pp. 712). The Mayer et al. definition misses an important aspect of  trust, though: in order for the situation
to be  meaningful,  the potential  trustee  has to have something to gain by performing an action that  is  not
favorable to the interests of  the trustor. If  not, the interests of  the two people are perfectly aligned and thus, in
general, there should be no problem. This notion is intended to overcome the notion of  opportunism, which is
defined by Williamson as  “self-interest  seeking with guile” (Williamson,  1985,  pp.  30).  A situation of  trust
implies the belief  by the trustor that the behavior of  the trustee is not going to be opportunistic.
In  a  more  recent  paper,  Schoorman  et  al.  revisited  and  commented  on  the  widely  examined  model  of
trustworthiness and trust they developed in 1995 (Schoorman, Mayer & Davis, 2007). They considered which
new aspects should be included to advance the research on trust. Specifically, they proposed that some new trust
topics that need to be developed include: time frame models, the relationships between trust and control systems
as managers of  risk, including variables that can show context dependence, setting up the role of  trust reparation
policies after a violation of  trust, deciding how attachments and emotion can have an impact on trust, and finally
studying how different cultures differ in their assessments of  the ability, benevolence and integrity of  trustees
(Schoorman et al., 2007, pp. 352). They have not changed their model in Mayer et al., and have argued that even
if  trust is a multilevel experience, they value their model because it is simple, yet it includes many of  the stages
that  the  trust  process  entails,  especially  regarding the  three dimensions of  trustworthiness,  which remained
unchanged.
These three dimensions of  trustworthiness proposed by Mayer and colleagues (ability, benevolence and integrity)
generate what the authors define as trust, moderated by the trustor’s propensity to trust (Mayer et al., 1995, pp.
715). The trustor evaluates these three aspects with respect to the trustee on the basis of  a specific situation. The
authors  draw a  parallel  between these  three  characteristics  and  the  foundation  of  convincing  in  Aristotle’s
Rhetoric, where he suggests that a speaker’s ethos (the speaker's power of  evincing a personal character which
will make his speech credible) is based on the listener’s perception of  intelligence, character and goodwill. Ability
corresponds to intelligence, but it is domain-specific; character (reliability, honesty) corresponds to integrity; and
goodwill corresponds to benevolence, which is the perception of  the trustee’s positive orientation toward the
trustor.
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It is important to stress that while the behavioral literature puts the emphasis on how trust is detected through
perceptions, we are more interested in showing how the reasons for trust are present and useful in practical
situations (i.e., whether a situation is centered on trust, how to face risk and how to enable cooperation, among
many  other  possibilities).  The  presence  of  trust  involves  some  assumptions.  Our  paper  deals  with  trust
foundations and how this connects with concepts of  trustworthiness perceptions, which may come afterwards,
and concepts that come after trustworthiness, such as risk-taking activities (see Figure 1 in Mayer et al., 1995, pp.
715). 
Our approach is consistent with the literature that considers trust as a multilevel relational process that needs
more guidance and specification (McEvily, 2011), and we support the thesis of  that article: that trust maters. The
antithesis, that trust does not matter, is true only in the case of  unbounded rationality, with its unlimited capacity
for calculation and self-knowledge.
We thus try to focus on making trust assumptions explicit, at the same time distinguishing trust from the concept
of  risk by making trust broader than mere calculative trust, and explicitly showing the distinction between the
two types of  trust. 
 In order to do that, we next turn to examining the basic framework for the trust experience. We focus on a dyad
of  trustor and trustee,  even if  we are willing to accept  that  people’s  assessment of  the trustworthiness of
another individual is influenced by aspects that also come from the organization in which the relationship occurs.
The dyad approach is  a  simplification which  is  valid  for  our  purposes  of  clarifying trust  assumptions  and
defining  trust  more  clearly,  since  it  is  not  situation  specific,  but  can  be  extended  to  different  types  of
relationships that are representative enough with the dyad as a symbolic relationship.
2.3.Bounded rationality: Ill-known payoffs and preferences
Most analyses of  bounded rationality focus on the limited ability of  human beings to derive (or calculate) the
consequences of  their actions. Some formalizations attempt to go further (e.g. by including a level of  aspiration
that  is  satisfying  instead  of  attempting  to  maximize  utility,  see  Selten,  1999).  Herbert  Simon’s  original
formulation of  the concept was wider, and included two additional characteristics of  human thought. Aside
from human beings’ limited ability to foresee the consequences of  their actions and the logical implications of
their thoughts, they also have a limited ability to anticipate whether they will  like the consequences of  their
actions, or how much they will enjoy the actions themselves: “It is a commonplace experience that an anticipated
pleasure may be a very different sort of  thing from a realized pleasure” (Simon, 1997, pp. 95). Finally, human
beings have a limited ability to find possible courses of  action as solutions to problems, i.e., the alternatives for
action are not out there waiting for someone to pick them up; they have to be generated, often at a considerable
cost and/or effort.
In order to analyze the role bounded rationality plays in the problem of  trust, we need to focus on the first two
of  these limitations. The first one essentially means that, in complex situations, agents may not be able to know
the actual payoffs to themselves, not only because of  external, or objective uncertainty (which may be present, of
course), but because they are not able to figure them out, or determine their probabilities with any degree of
accuracy.  One  of  the  characteristics  of  unbounded  rationality  involves  being  able  to  accurately  assess  the
probabilities of  uncertain external events. Contrary to an extended belief, uncertainty is perfectly compatible
with unbounded rationality  provided that the agents can make an accurate evaluation of  the probability  of
uncertain events and are able to evaluate the results of  their actions with (again) an accurate estimation of  the
probability of  those results obtaining (and also, as we show next, the utility they derive from those results given
the risk).  The inability to assess such probabilities includes the possibility of  being unable to foresee certain
specific consequences; or, in more formal terms, the possibility that agents may assign a zero probability to
events that are perfectly conceivable, because they have simply overlooked them. For A, this limitation represents
uncertainties with respect to B’s behavior in addition to the usual uncertainties about objective events.
The second characteristic  is  like  an extension  of  the  first  one:  agents  are  unable  to  accurately  predict  the
subjective part of  the payoff, i.e., the utility to themselves of  the expected results. In other words, decision-
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makers have to anticipate future preferences of  which they cannot be sure. March states this distinction very
clearly:  “The  conception  of  choice  enshrined  in  the  axioms  of  contemporary  decision  theory  and
microeconomics assumes optimization over alternatives on the basis of  two guesses. The first guess is about the
uncertain future consequences that will follow from alternative actions that might be taken. The second guess is
about the uncertain future preferences the decision-maker will have with respect to those consequences when
they are realized” (March, 1987, pp. 155).
In the context of  trust, the implications go beyond the uncertainty added to A about B’s behavior, which has
already been considered above. The problem is particularly interesting when the explicit, quantifiable payoffs are
of  the kind that lead to the trust problem. Formal examples of  this can be seen in Rosanas (2016). In these
cases, the trustee has an explicit incentive to betray. But what value do the non-quantitative variables have for the
trustee? Under unbounded rationality, the answer is quite clear (at least to him/her). Thus, if  the non-quantitative
variables can be perfectly valued, as they are in Rosanas (2016), the problem ends there, and Williamson (1993) is
right. In contrast, with bounded rationality, it may well be that honoring A’s trust is in B’s best interest, but B
him/herself  may not know it (or, at least, not without some doubt or fuzziness). 
Also, under bounded rationality, B may be sorry after making his/her choice, whatever that choice may be, which
may change the alternative B chooses next time, if  there is a next time. For instance, when making his or her
initial decision, B may magnify the importance of  the quantitative variables and betray A, only to realize – too
late – that the non-quantitative variables were at least as important as the quantitative ones. Of  course, the
opposite may happen as well: on reflection, B may decide to honor A’s trust because of  the qualitative variables,
only to find later on that they were not that important after all.
Human beings may face the same problem over and over again through time and make different decisions
because of  learning, or because of  different states of  mind (emotion, for instance) that bring some aspects of
their  lives  and  some  of  their  values  into  the  focus  of  their  attention  to  the  relative  neglect  of  others
(Loewenstein, 1996; Simon, 1983; Simon, 1987). In the presence of  a time constraint (which would be irrelevant
in the  case  of  unbounded rationality),  when decision time is  scarce,  an optimization approach may not  be
feasible for an agent who is not so familiar with the problem (Selten, 1999). 
The ability to optimize may not be symmetrically distributed in a problem involving trust (i.e., one of  the agents
may be more familiar with the problem and how to solve it than the other). To be specific, if  A is more familiar
with the problem than B, A may think  it  is  a  possibility  that  B will  choose wrongly  according to B’s own
preferences, harming A in turn. The possibility of  A trusting B is obviously affected by this type of  assessment.
Persuasion may play an important role in those situations.
Hirschman (1984) has argued that there are two kinds of  activities. Some human activities are instrumental, and
are done in order to get a paycheck or an explicit reward. Others are not: those activities that are undertaken for
their own sake or that carry their own reward fall  into this category. Some activities have such an uncertain
reward that they will seldom be undertaken for that reason. There is an education process in such activities,
however. Not everybody likes them, only those people that  have ‘learned to love them’.  This is  unlikely to
happen with simple, routine types of  jobs or activities. But it is much more likely in more complex situations,
precisely where trust is of  higher importance than in rather simple contexts. The Hirschman analysis includes
other factors, like the willingness to put plans of  action into practice, which will be considered below.
This is of  course related to the classical distinction in the behavioral sciences between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic”
motives. This distinction comes from the literature of  the 1950s and 1960s (see, e.g., Lawler, 1969; Saleh & Hyde,
1969). Ryan and Deci (2000) and Lindenberg (2001) distinguish between “intrinsic motivation, which refers to
doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable, and extrinsic motivation, which refers to doing
something because it leads to a separable outcome” (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Frey (1997) and Osterloh and Frey
(2003), consider that intrinsic motivation may have a hedonic component of  enjoyment, while at the same time
there is a normative intrinsic motivation out of  a sense of  obligation. We add to that the possibility of  learning,
i.e., that the intrinsic motivation may not be apparent from the beginning, but may have to be learned or acquired
(as we will see below) by persuasion.
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In general, preferences may change through time, depending on each agent’s experience. An agent may ‘learn to
love’ some variables or situations, and ‘learn to hate’ others. Intangible variables found in business situations, like
the value placed on personnel development, the public image of  the company, or the internal human climate of
the firm, may change dramatically through time, as agents learn about their jobs, about the organization and
about themselves.
An important aspect of  this learning process is persuasion. In a world of  unbounded rationality, there is no place
for persuasion: every agent knows his/her preferences perfectly (including the evolution of  preferences through
time) and there is no reason to change. By contrast, in a world of  bounded rationality, while some variables
(monetary rewards, for instance) are easy for everybody to appreciate, persuasion may play an important role in
‘learning to love’ some goals or activities. Barnard (1938) already stressed the importance of  persuasion as one
of  the crucial methods (together with incentives) to get people to work in the interest of  the organization. At
present, common everyday experience, as well the momentum of  communication courses in business schools,
can be said to confirm Barnard’s intuition.
In the context of  the analysis of  trust, the importance of  the imperfect knowledge of  one’s own preferences,
which implies the kind of  learning just mentioned, cannot be overstated. But with bounded rationality, even if
both the monetary and non-monetary results are well-known (perhaps with some uncertainty), the utility that
agents derive from them is not well-known, and there may be some need for persuasion in order to get an
employee (or an external stakeholder) to cooperate. If  we go back to Figure 1 and we consider that, aside from
the explicit results shown, there are also some non-monetary results, B may be indifferent between the results
derived from betraying or honoring trust; however, B may be persuaded (by A or by anyone else) that he/she will
be better off  with the results when honoring the trust. If  A believes B has been persuaded, A may trust B to
achieve a result that is optimal economically and otherwise. But, of  course, if  B is disappointed, his/her attitude
next time around will  surely  be different.  So, persuasion needs some element of  truth to work in repeated
interactions.
2.4. Systems of  preferences and values
According to Simon, bounded rationality is the type of  behavior that is “intendedly rational, but only limitedly
so”  (Simon,  1957,  xxiv).  Typically,  it  is  intendedly  rational  through a  system of  preferences  and values.  In
economic theory, the preferences of  individuals are considered to be “arbitrary”. In economic theory, rationality
essentially means the consistency of  those preferences (in technical terms, transitivity of  preferences) to avoid
circularities;  but, except for that aspect,  the preferences of  two individuals between, say, two goods, may be
completely  unrelated.  In a  world of  unbounded rationality,  a  preference map is  a  perfect  reflection of  the
individual’s preferences and values, and there is no distinction between different levels of  values by importance
or by familiarity with the specific situation.
Under  bounded  rationality,  however,  values  may  look  substantially  different.  Herbert  Simon  borrowed  the
distinction between fact and value from the logical positivistic philosophy (Simon, 1997, chapters 1, 3 and 4). In
accordance with that philosophy, he related rationality to the choice of  means conducive to the achievement of
previously selected goals (Simon, 1997, pp. 4). The selection of  goals itself  would not be rational or irrational,
then, it would just be a matter of  taste on the part of  the individuals.
Simon recognized, though, that there is a “hierarchy of  decisions”, a means-ends chain so that a given goal is
often a means to achieve a higher end: “Ends themselves are often merely instrumental to more final objectives
(…) Rationality, then, has to do with the construction of  means-ends chains of  this kind” (Simon, 1997, pp. 73).
Therefore, whether a final  end is  achieved through an intermediate end or not is  entirely a matter of  fact,
susceptible of  being tested empirically. For many human beings, most of  the means pursued actively are only
means to higher ends. 
Preferences, then, operate essentially on the higher ends; and the lower ends are obtained as a consequence.
Rokeach (1973) claims that people have relatively few basic values. Then, according to Fischhoff, Slovic and
Liechtenstein: “If, as Rokeach claims, people have relatively few basic values, producing an answer to a specific
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value  question  is  largely  an exercise  in  inference.  We must  decide  which of  our  values  are  relevant  to the
situation, how they are to be interpreted, and what weight each is to be given” (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein,
1988, pp. 401).
In particular, this applies to the context of  the results to be achieved in a business firm, or in any organization in
general. Profitability (or financial equilibrium) is always one of  the crucial variables desired by managers, but at
the same time they also value market position, or competitive advantage, or organizational knowledge, perhaps as
a means to achieve the higher end of  profitability, or perhaps even as higher ends in and of  themselves. It is
often claimed that,  in business firms,  profitability  is  the overriding goal  and that all  other ends have to be
considered “intermediate” and evaluated instrumentally as means. However, other goals may also rank high in
the hierarchy, such as social responsibility or personnel development.
Individuals, however, may not be able, or even willing, to make decisions in accordance with the relatively few
basic values. Bounded rationality limits their ability to do so, and they have spontaneous impulses that may pull
them in a different direction from those few basic values. Hence, their ability to make choices that are logically
consistent with them is also limited. However, these limitations differ depending on the situation: in familiar
situations, individuals are better able to optimize with respect to higher ends, and, thus, they may have very
definite preferences in relation to lower ends: “People are more likely to have clear preferences regarding issues
that are familiar, simple and directly experienced. Each of  these properties is associated with opportunities for
trial-and-error learning, particularly such learning as may be summarized in readily applicable rules or homilies.
Those rules provide stereotypic, readily justifiable responses to future questions of  values. When adopted by
individuals, they may be seen as habits; when adopted by groups, they constitute traditions” (Fischhoff  et al.,
1988, pp. 399).
This  may be  seen as  a  specific  instance  of  Simon’s  view about  the  role  of  intuition  and emotion.  Simon
considers intuition as a shortcut in the chain of  reasoning, in situations that are familiar, or that ring a bell with
respect to similar experiences from the past (Simon, 1987). The Fischhoff  et al. (1988) quote above may thus be
seen as the application of  that approach to the selection of  values: for familiar situations, individuals know (or
think they know) what preferences are coherent with the higher values; but in more unfamiliar situations, they
might not. Fischhoff  et al. (1988) also provide an interesting list of  the states of  mind associated with not
knowing what you want in less familiar situations and some of  the actions that follow (Fischhoff  et al., 1988, pp.
400). That list is adapted by the authors in the form of  a decision tree in the Appendix of  this document.
We can see that having a coherent opinion and accessing it properly (the implicit assumption in fully rational
models of  behavior) is only one possibility among many. Knowing what you want is, one might say, almost the
anomaly. It is perfectly possible for someone to have no opinion, or an incoherent one, not to realize it, and
make decisions is spite of  that.  Living with incoherence is another possibility: in spite of  higher ends being
incompatible with some lower ends, people may try to achieve both (and fail, of  course).
Applied to a situation involving trust between two people, the exercise in inference suggested by Fischhoff  et al.
in the above quotation would essentially consist in evaluating the possible dimensions of  the consequences of
each alternative,  and evaluating  to what  extent  the  higher  values  are  served.  But  the  action to  be  initiated
following this  analysis  may be in contradiction with lower ends,  or  immediate desires,  or  impulses,  and the
individual may be willing to be inconsistent. For instance, an individual may evaluate that Alternative 1 is better
than Alternative 2 in terms of  the higher values, but not in terms of  the immediate monetary rewards. If  those
of  Alternative 2 are bigger, the individual may be willing to live with the inconsistency. 
In the next section we will go into the problem of  willpower, by which one individual may really want to achieve
a high objective, but be incapable of  taking the corresponding action in the short run. For the time being, it is
important to notice that we are not analyzing that problem yet, but only the problem at the cognitive level.
It follows from the list in the Appendix that rationality is not equally bounded for everybody. That is, some
individuals  try harder to be rational  than others:  some people  are more reflective,  and willing to check for
coherence and act coherently with the higher ends. Others are more impulsive, or willing to pursue immediate,
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lower ends without  much reflection or need for coherence.  For any specific  individual,  the probability  that
he/she is going to be more coherent is higher in familiar issues than in issues that are not as familiar, as stated in
the above reference by Selten (1999) and the quote by Fischoff  et al. (1988).
In summary, some people are willing to act coherently with their stable, higher values in spite of  their short-term
urges to do otherwise, and some are less willing. The type of  behavior that consists of  trying to be coherent with
some stable, or permanent, set of  higher ends is what is usually called integrity. 
3. Different bases for trust
3.1. Trust based on personal competence 
Personal competence is similar to what the behavioral literature on trust labels ability. It is a basic aspect of  trust
that has been defined by Bidault and Jarillo using the example of  a surgeon: “Having trust in a surgeon goes
beyond (only) thinking that he is honest. It is, more than anything else, believing that he will do his job well. The
term ‘well’ in this context refers to patients’ concept of  ‘state-of-the-art’” (Bidault & Jarillo, 1997, pp. 85). They
continue:  “The  other  party  is  expected  to  have  the  necessary  skills  to  carry  out  the  tasks  specific  to  the
transaction agreed upon” (Bidault & Jarillo, 1997, pp.85). They label this type of  trust, “technical trust” and for
them this includes the technical expertise associated with that profession together with the general competence
that the profession requires.  This concept  is  similar  to  what Mayer,  Davis and Schoorman labeled “ability”
(1995p.717).  Following  their  definition,  ability  is  “that  group of  skills,  competences  and characteristics  that
enable a party to have influence within some specific domain. The domain of  the ability is specific because the
trustee may be highly competent in some technical area, affording that person trust on tasks related to that area”
(1995p. 717). Rosanas (2016) attempts to formalize that professional competence as the trustee having better
information about the underlying phenomenon than the trustor. Technical expertise, ability or better information
associated  with  professional  competence  are  necessary  conditions  for  A  to  be  able  to  trust  B  in  any
circumstance: if  B does not have that, he/she cannot be trusted to produce an outcome that is good for both
sides. We summarize our analysis in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: An essential element of  trust is the professional competence of  the trustee: technical expertise,
abilities and better information are necessary for the trustee to obtain the desired results. 
3.2. Trust based on integrity: Value systems
Of  course, the necessary condition in our Proposition 1 is not sufficient. In a way that is consistent with Mayer
et al. (1995), we will now review the role played by integrity. 
According to Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, integrity is precisely the “adherence to a code of
moral, artistic or other values” (Webster, 1972, pp. 439). An important part of  an individual’s trust in other
individuals will then reside in their integrity. We now turn our attention to this type of  trust.
If  we examine the trust problem in the light of  the previous section on values and preferences, we see how trust
becomes meaningful in our context of  bounded rationality. The trustor, A, can make an (uncertain) assessment
of  the basic values of  the trustee, B, and his/her willingness to make decisions as consistent with that set of
values. That is what makes this situation different from the case of  unbounded rationality:  with unbounded
rationality, any individual can see his/her whole preference map and all of  the decisions he/she makes are by
necessity  consistent  with  that  preference  map.  With  bounded rationality,  in  contrast,  there  is  an  additional
uncertainty about B’s integrity, i.e., B’s capacity to make decisions consistent with that basic set of  values and
preferences. 
It is important to note that, so far, no assumptions have been made as to the content of  the basic values. Thus,
those values may be shared by A, or not. A may trust that B will (or will not) do something because of  the basic
set of  values A assumes B has, not because A agrees with those values. Suppose, for instance, that A and B have
different religious beliefs. A may know that B’s religion forbids some practices, and that B is a strong believer.
Then, A may trust B even if  that action, forbidden by B’s religion, is not considered bad by A at all. The example
-10-
Intangible Capital – https://doi.org/10.3926/ic.1407
of  Yudhishthira in the Mahabharata epic, cited by Dasgupta (1988), is very much to the point here. Renowned
for his trustworthiness, Yudhishthira once lied in order to throw off  his unrighteous enemies. The lie worked
because the enemies (who had a completely different value system that did not place value on trustworthiness)
believed that Yudhishthira would not lie. 
In the means-ends chains that  human beings construct under bounded rationality,  intermediate values are a
means to more final  values.  Obviously,  though,  those  higher  values need to be  consistent  with each other;
otherwise, a contradiction would require sacrificing one of  them. In specific contexts, contradictions may arise.
In this context, the Mahabharata example is particularly useful, because Yudhishthira would not lie to obtain
immediate  benefits  for  himself.  Truthfulness  is  an  important  (higher)  value  for  him,  but  he  lies  to  defeat
unrighteous enemies. Thus, according to Dasgupta, he qualifies as a consequentialist. A slightly different way of
looking at the same problem is as a conflict between two values, both of  which are rather high in the hero’s
preferences: truthfulness and the good of  his people. When they are perceived as being incompatible, he resolves
in favor of  defeating the enemies, even if  it is through a lie, because the good of  his people is considered to be
higher.
The  basic  set  of  values  may  be  more  or  less  volatile,  depending  on  specific  individuals  and  on  their
circumstances. But A’s beliefs about B’s set of  basic values (the content of  those values, how stable they are, and
to what extent B is willing to make decisions based on them) will determine A’s subjective probability p that B
will honor or betray his/her trust. Then, in this context, trusting B implies A’s belief  that B is willing to make a
given decision according to his/her entire set of  values, beyond the explicit, monetary values involved in the
decision. This is the concept of  trust based on integrity, which can be expressed in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: An essential element of  trust is the trustee’s willingness to act in accordance with his/her system
of  values and preferences, because this makes the behavior of  the trustee more predictable in specific situations. 
3.3. Trust based on unselfish values 
As we have seen, no matter what the values are and whether the trustor agrees with them or not, a person may
be willing to make decisions that are consistent with them, or, on the contrary, a person may be rather impulsive.
But, then, if  we don’t say anything else about the values, the result in terms of  trust depends on the specific
situation and the specific values involved. In other words, we cannot say that A trusts B in general, but A trusts B
only under some specific circumstances and in some specific issue. Of  course, the fact that the behavior of  the
trustee is predictable does not necessarily mean that the trustee will generally make decisions that are favorable to
the trustor. For this to be true, we need to go one step further, to consider the kind of  values that trustor and
trustee have. 
From this point of  view, values can be purely selfish or altruistic; they may rate truth-telling, or fairness, or
friendship, or social welfare, or the common good (the summum bonum of  the Schoolmen) high or low. If  B’s
values are selfish, then A can perhaps trust B about a specific problem, or for a small class of  decisions only. In
contrast, if  B’s values are non-selfish, A may be willing to trust B for a wide class of  decisions.
Proposition 3:  An essential basis of  trust between two people under a variety of  circumstances is that the
trustee must have a system of  values and preferences in which some non-selfish, or social, values (or, simply, the
interests of  other people) are placed high, and the trustee must be willing to make decisions according to such a
system of  values and preferences.
3.4. Trust based on the moral virtues of  the trustee
In economic models of  decision-making and organization (with unbounded rationality), it is typically assumed
that people are impatient, i.e., that they like to experience rewards soon and costs later. This is captured in such
models through the use of  a utility function discounting utility over time exponentially. Such preferences are
called  time-consistent.  But,  in  O’Donoghue  and  Rabin’s  words:  “Casual  observation,  introspection,  and
psychological research all suggest that the assumption of  time-consistency is importantly wrong. It ignores the
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human tendency to grab immediate rewards and to avoid immediate costs in a way that our ‘long-run selves’ do
not appreciate” (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999, pp. 103).
The  problem  of  the  discrepancy  between  a  person’s  preferences  at  different  times  is  also  an  old  one  in
philosophy.  The  basis  of  Aristotle’s  criticism of  Socratic  ethics  was  that  very  point.  In Aristotle’s  analysis,
Socrates had said that “nobody acts in opposition to what is best if  he has a clear idea of  what he is doing. He
can only go wrong out of  ignorance.” The reasoning, however, and again according to Aristotle, “is in glaring
contrast with notorious facts”: people may know what is right and not do it because of  weakness of  will, or lack
of  control (Aristotle, 2000, Book VII).
Schelling (1978; 1984) has studied the problem of  time-inconsistency in depth. Wanting to quit smoking but not
doing it; Christmas accounts that protect your money from yourself; free loans from the taxpayer to the IRS by
understating the  number  of  dependents;  placing the alarm clock across  the  room; setting the  watch a  few
minutes ahead to deceive oneself…”
“In these examples, everybody behaves like two people, one who wants clean lungs and long life and another one
who adores tobacco, or one who wants a lean body and another who wants dessert. The two are in a continual
contest for control: the ‘straight’ one often in command most of  the time, but the wayward one needing only to
get occasional control to spoil the other’s best laid plan” (Schelling, 1978, pp. 290).
The two selves are not equally important in Schelling’s analysis. He is obviously partial to the “straight” self. The
section titled “Strategy and Tactic,” for instance, in the 1984 paper, consists of  recommendations so that the
“straight” self  can be in command of  the “wayward” self: relinquish authority, let somebody else hold your car
keys, order your lunch in advance, don’t keep liquor or tobacco in the house, order a hotel room without a
television, do your food shopping after breakfast...
Bazerman, Tenbrunsel and Wade-Benzoni (1998) formulate the problem in a slightly different way. They suggest
that the two-selves theory can be conveniently made easier, into a “want/should” explanation, based on the
empirical evidence available. When people are asked what they want, their responses will be emotional, affective,
impulsive, and hot-headed; whereas when they are asked what they should do, their responses will be rational,
cognitive, thoughtful and cool-headed. These are then the two selves: the “want self,” and the “should” self. 
In an approach that is complementary to the previous ones, to some extent, Loewenstein (1996) attributes the
fact that people often act against their self-interest, in full knowledge that they are doing so, to “visceral factors”
(hunger, pain, sexual desire, moods and emotions, etc.). Later, Kahneman examined in context the problems
related with not knowing exactly what one wants (Kahneman, 2011).
In general, there is no doubt casted on the fact that human beings are sometimes incapable of  doing what they
think is in their best interest. Doing what one thinks one should do (what can be labeled “the dominion of  the
‘should’ self  over the ‘want’ self ”), is what Aristotle called developing moral virtues or practical wisdom applied
to oneself. The Aristotelian view looks at moral virtues being acquired with practice, what he called “practical
wisdom.” If  that is true, one could expect that the impact of  visceral factors, or the relative importance of  the
want and should selves, will depend very much on each individual and his/her past history regarding the personal
development of  moral virtue (or practical wisdom).
The organizational  context makes things even more complex.  A manager’s self-interest  may be substantially
different from the (otherwise espoused) organizational objective. The manager may say, for instance, that the
main goal of  the firm lies in value maximization, while he or she may take actions that destroy long-term value at
the same time, possibly for short-term benefit. Jensen (2000) and Senge (2000) provide excellent examples of
that possibility. Jensen argues that this is the result of  “the tendency of  human beings to resort to short-term
value-destroying actions in the name of  value creation” (Jensen, 2000, pp.50). Indeed, and again according to
Jensen, the latest financial scandals have only confirmed this tendency, even to an extreme degree (Jensen, 2002).
This analysis leads naturally to the following proposition:
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Proposition 4: A crucial element in one person trusting another is whether the second person is able to put into
practice what he/she thinks will be best for him/herself  in the long run, in spite of  possibly attractive, short-
term results. 
The analysis in this section introduces a new facet of  the word “trust.” Previously, we consistently referred to the
decision-making process as if  all decisions made by an economic agent were to be immediately implemented
with no problem. In the last section we suggested that this may not be so, and that the decision may change
before implementation, not because of  any new information coming in, or any changes in one’s tastes, or any
further  thoughts  on  the  basic  values,  but  because  of  a  lack  of  control  of  oneself.  In  terms  of  bounded
rationality,  it  can be  interpreted that  the  decision-maker’s  focus  of  attention  shifts  to  the  more immediate,
attractive variables, in preference to future variables that are, in fact, preferable for an individual with unbounded
rationality. To implement what one considers being the right or rational decision, willpower is needed. This is the
Aristotelian point of  view, cited in the previous section. 
Different people at different points in time will have different degrees of  willpower. According to Aristotle, this
develops through practice. Ordinarily, an individual’s willpower to do what he/she considers to be the right thing
is  too  little  (as  in  the  Schelling  examples),  but  Benabou  and  Tirole  (2002)  have  shown  how,  under  some
conditions,  people  sometimes  adopt  excessively  rigid  rules  that  result  in  compulsive  behaviors  such  as
miserliness, workaholism, or anorexia. Quite obviously, this excess virtue is also acquired, as in the Aristotelian
account, through practice. We summarize our focus in studying trust in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Assumptions for trust and antecedents of  trust perceptions
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3.5. The probability of  B honoring A’s trust
In fact, a trustor A, has to formally or informally assess the probability p that a trustee, B, will honor the trust. In
fact, the trustor has to assess four probabilities: the probability pc that the trustee has competence on the matter
at hand, the probability pv that the values of  the other agent are stable and consistent, the probability ps that such
values are pro-social or at least not selfish and that B will  choose to honor (possibly in spite of  immediate
material rewards for doing the opposite), and the probability pw that B will in fact have the willpower to put that
decision into practice, given that the decision has been made, i.e. (assuming they are independent):
p = pc . pv . ps . pw
Obviously,  pv and  ps depend on B’s system of  values and on the willingness B has to make rational decisions
according to that system; while  pw depends on B’s willpower,  and on the availability  of  attractive alternative
actions to betray A. If  there are no immediate, attractive rewards for B to betray A, so that B has no problem
honoring A’s trust, then pw will be equal to 1; and the more attractive the rewards available to B for betraying A,
the lower pw will be. In summary:
Trust in another person is based on an assessment of  four factors: (1) competence; (2) adherence of  the other
person to a (stable and consistent) system of  values; (3) that such a system of  values somehow includes social
goals or the interests of  other people; and (4) the willpower of  the other person to put into practice what he/she
believes he/she should. Let us stress, however, that an essential point in our analysis is that such an assessment
cannot be done with any precision, for this would require unbounded rationality and we are in the opposite
context. That is why trust cannot be merely calculative.
3.6. On the empirical evaluation of  the p’s
There is an important difference between the foundation of  trust resting on judgment and competence and the
foundation of  trust  resting on preferences  and integrity.  The former  is  entirely  empirical:  B cannot  fake a
knowledge that he/she does not have, and once he/she has it, he/she will continue to have it in the future. B, of
course, may have to adapt to new situations in the future and learn more, and B may be luckier or unluckier in
the short run, but the fact remains that the proof  of  B’s competence is in the empirical success in the (average)
results of  his/her decisions. 
The latter, in contrast, cannot be entirely empirical. It is empirical to the extent that all knowledge of  the real
world comes (obviously) from observation of  empirical facts; but there is an important problem associated with
assessing someone else’s preferences and values: they can be faked. In repetitive decisions, one agent may fake a
preference for some variables just to gain someone else’s trust, then, once this is achieved, betray the other party.
In fact, it is rather common for embezzlers to have an immaculate history of  honesty, even to excess, until, one
day, they betray the trust deposited in them (demonstrating, incidentally, that the trustor was actually vulnerable).
So, for both reasons, even if  a given person has shown unchanging preferences over a long period of  time, one
can never be sure that this behavior will continue indefinitely.
This is closely related to a well-known problem in philosophy, the problem of  induction. Bertrand Russell (1959)
remarked that the fact that, for ages,  we have observed the Sun rising every day does not necessarily imply that it
is going to rise tomorrow. The chances that the Sun will rise tomorrow vary greatly with the causal explanation
we attribute to its motion. If  the sun rises because some giants light a ball of  fire at night every night and raise it
in the morning, then, if  one day they are too tired, or they feel whimsical, they may not light it at all. Yet, this was
an explanation believed by some of  our ancestors not too long ago, by historical standards. Currently, we believe
in the laws of  motion, gravitation and the Earth’s rotation as causes of  the sun rising, and this makes it much
more unlikely that the sun will not rise tomorrow. Too many things would have to change. The will of  the giants
may change much more easily than the motion of  enormous bodies and their laws.
Notice that the Russell example involves only physical systems (according to the explanation we accept today,
one might add), where there are no reasons for doubting the regularity of  the phenomenon. But if  induction is a
complex issue in the natural sciences, it is even more complex when the system under study is a human being.
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The parable of  the inductivist chicken provided (again) by Russell is very much to the point here: “Domestic
animals expect food when they see the person who usually feeds them. We know that all these rather crude
expectations of  uniformity are liable to be misleading. The man who has fed the chicken every day throughout
its life at last wrings its neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of  nature would have
been useful to the chicken” (Russell, 1959, pp. 35).
In other words, mere repetition of  a given choice by one individual is not a good basis to infer that it will be
repeated again. Human beings are purposeful systems, and may have intentions completely different from the
ones that seem obvious; and unless there is some understanding of  the real reasons why they act, any forecast of
their next action may turn out to be completely wrong. 
Bounded rationality  is  again a  determining concept.  With unbounded rationality,  human beings  would have
unlimited capacity for faking preferences; but they would also have unlimited capacity for accounting for that
fact.  That  is,  it  would not  be too difficult  for  one person to try to trick the  others,  but  the others  would
immediately  assign a  probability  to  that  eventuality  and incorporate  it  into their  subjective  probability.  The
success of  such a strategy would therefore be in doubt. 
With bounded rationality, one agent may try to internalize the value and preference system of  the other, partly
through previous formal interactions of  the same kind, but partly through other means of  communication:
words, body language, common friends, shared beliefs, attitudes… All these factors are relevant to determining
the probability p that B will honor A’s trust. The crucial fact, however, is that mere historical repetition of  a given
alternative in previous, similar situations (“reputation,” if  by that word we simply mean the other person’s track
record) is hardly enough. Internalizing the way the other person thinks and his/her value system is an important
element in the assessment of  the probability of  the other person honoring or betraying trust.
3.7. Individualistic-rationalistic approach versus social and cultural approaches
This paper has taken the individualistic-rationalistic approach, which starts from the assumption that trust is
rationally based. The analysis in the previous section, though, suggests that the social and cultural approach is
also needed as a complement. When evaluating the probability of  someone else’s behavior, social and cultural
factors cannot be ignored, mainly in the broader context – the delegation setting mentioned before – which does
not refer to one specific decision situation. But we want to show here that, while the individualistic-rationalistic
approach is incomplete to deal with the problem of  trust, some of  the characteristics of  trust that are purported
to be socially and culturally based are often a social reflection of  the rationalistic approach.
Several researchers (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995) have emphasized the propensity to trust as one of  the important
characteristics that conditions actual trust, either suggesting that each person’s personal experience is at the base
of  this propensity, or else pointing out that different cultural backgrounds differ in their propensity to trust
(Hofstede, 1980). 
As we have seen, Fischoff  et al. (1988, pp. 399) argued that habits and traditions can be seen as trial-and-error
learning summarized in rules and homilies,  and that they provide stereotypic, readily justifiable responses to
questions of  values. This is particularly relevant in our context, because it means that the bases of  trust can be
considered to be instrumental  from the beginning.  Intuitions,  rules and traditions provide an initial  a priori
probability p that trust will be honored by the other party, and any subsequent interactions of  any kind (verbal or
non-verbal  communication,  real  actions  between the  two individuals,  etc.)  may  modify  that  probability.  Of
course, for specific individuals this accumulated learning is transmitted only as a social habit or tradition.
Many of  the individualistic-rationalistic models justify social beliefs and attitudes towards trust. Thus, Neilson
(1999) develops a model where two agents interact repeatedly in a prisoner’s dilemma, and shows that an agent A
is willing to do costly favors for another agent B if  A expects to receive favors in return in the future. His
approach is  quite clearly individualistic-rationalistic;  of  course, creating the social climate where one expects
reciprocity in doing favors makes it easier for cooperation to exist. Along similar lines, Spagnolo (1999) shows
how workers have an incentive to cooperate if  there is  a large enough probability  that the other party will
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cooperate.  Valley,  Moag and Bazerman (1998) show how,  with asymmetric  information,  the communication
medium (which is obviously a social creation) affects the distribution of  outcomes, reflecting different degrees
of  truth-telling and trust across the media. Tullock (1999) changes the usual conditions of  experiments using the
prisoner’s dilemma (i.e., he does not pre-select contestants, he does not prevent them from communicating and
he does not change partners in the middle) and gets a very high degree of  cooperation, in contrast with what
happens under the usual conditions.
Thus, many unconscious habits may have their origins in rational attitudes. Dasgupta provides a good description
of  many of  these factors from the rational perspective: “We form an opinion on the basis of  his background,
the opportunities he has faced, the courses of  action he has taken, and so forth. Our opinion is thus based partly
on the  theory  we hold  of  the  effect  of  culture,  class  membership,  family  line,  and the  like  on  a  person’s
motivation (his disposition) and hence his behavior” (Dasgupta, 1988, pp. 54).
But notice that two kinds of  elements enter into this description. Background, culture, class membership, family
line and so on may be considered (paradoxically perhaps) elements of  the individualistic-rationalistic approach.
They are elements that may indicate the kind of  person the hypothetical trustee is, and what specifically can be
expected from such a person: first-hand experiences, reputation, track record and so on. 
In contrast, “the theory we hold of  the effect of....” is clearly a cultural creation of  the social group to which the
would-be trustor belongs. Obviously, though, those social influences do not exhaust the explanation of  one
individual’s propensity to trust, which by necessity must include personal factors.
The line between the individualistic-rationalistic point of  view and the influence that the social environment
exerts upon individuals is difficult to draw. Probability p is partly determined by the social background of  the
individual and partly by the individual’s direct experience. Social, cultural and relational aspects of  trust, however,
have a background of  instrumentality behind them. 
Tyler and Degoey (1996, pp. 339) analyze in some depth the reasons why the instrumental view might not be
enough to explain the phenomenon of  trust. They give three arguments. First, if  trust is merely instrumental,
“people will care about trustworthiness when they are dependent on the organization or vulnerable to harm.”
Instead, what they found is that trustworthiness is central when people have “a personal connection with the
authorities or identify with the organization.” While this claim may of  course be true, a personal connection with
the authorities, or identification with the organization requires some knowledge of  the authorities’ value system,
on which that trust can be based, according to this paper’s analysis, on an instrumental basis.
Second,  in  the  instrumental  model,  one  would  expect  that  trust  would  be  “linked  to  satisfaction  with  the
authority’s  decisions”;  whereas  if  it  is  relational,  it  should be  “linked to judgments  about  the  neutrality  of
authorities and the degree to which these authorities treat their subordinates with dignity and respect.” Again,
under a rational-instrumental approach it is perfectly possible to argue that the value system of  the authorities is
at the root of  the subordinates’ trust in them. 
Finally, if  trust is instrumental in character, “judgments about the competence of  authorities should be more
strongly linked to people’s willingness to accept an authority’s decision than judgments about the benevolence of
authorities.” The way the problem of  trust has been analyzed in this paper, that claim would have to be denied,
given that the willingness to accept an authority’s decision is related to trust in that authority, and that trust
might,  in  fact,  be  based  partly  on  competence  and partly  on  value  systems,  a  particular  case  of  which  is
benevolence.
In summary, and as we have stated already, some of  the characteristics of  trust that are often assumed to be
socially and culturally based may also be a social reflection of  a rationalistic attitude.
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4. Recapitulation and conclusions
Trust is a complex subject. It is elusive, as we have recognized from the beginning, and has many facets. It can
have  very  different  meanings,  which we have  tried  to  explore  analytically  in  this  paper.  Now it  is  time to
recapitulate and see where everything stands.
This paper started from the premise that trust is meaningful only if  there is bounded rationality. In the context
of  this paper, this essentially stresses the point that agents do not have full knowledge of  their own preferences
and values, which completely changes the meaning of  trust and the reasons for its existence. Under bounded
rationality, preferences are organized in value systems, but the decisions made may or may not be consistent with
them. A person’s willingness to act according to the higher values (typically few in number) is one possible
reason to trust that the person will follow some course of  action that may be in that person’s own best interest,
though it may not be the most attractive in terms of  the immediate variables of  both effort and results. “Trust,”
then, means the belief  by the trustor that the trustee will make the decision according to his/her real value
system, even if  some immediate variables push him/her in the opposite direction.
The next conclusion is rather intuitive. If, besides being consistent with a value system, some of  the trustee’s
higher values are non-selfish, and include, for example, truthfulness, friendship, social welfare, etc., they provide a
better  basis  for  trust,  i.e.,  the  trustor  may  believe  that  the  trustee  will  not  take  advantage  of  his/her
vulnerabilities. In contrast with the previous situation, where values were not necessarily non-selfish, here the
concept of  trust may go beyond specific situations and extend to a class of  decisions. This is, therefore, the
concept that provides a foundation for taking some risks in situations of  decentralization of  authority, giving
power to the trustee for a certain type of  decisions.
Finally,  whatever  the  actual  preferences  and values  are,  the  trustee’s  action depends on his/her  capacity  to
actually put into practice what he/she thinks is good according to his/her own system of  values; therefore,
trusting someone means trusting his/her capacity to do precisely that.
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Appendix: Possible list of  psychological states associated with not knowing what you want
Intangible Capital, 2019 (www.intangiblecapital.org)
Article's contents are provided on an Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 Creative commons International License. Readers are allowed to
copy, distribute and communicate article's contents, provided the author's and Intangible Capital's names are included. It must not be
used for commercial purposes. To see the complete license contents, please visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/.
-21-
